

Unclassified



JOINT ASSESSMENTS

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JOINT ASSESSMENTS

Implications of the Defense Readiness Reporting System and Training Transformation

1.1 Introduction. Ultimately, military forces have only two responsibilities; to successfully conduct operations and to successfully prepare for those operations. While the military forces of the United States have been extraordinarily successful at accomplishing the former, improvements are needed with respect to the latter. The challenge of rationalizing expenditure of resources in support of military personnel, materiel, and training is often difficult to justify in times of relative peace. However, the difficulty of the challenge does not negate the requirement for success. The recent Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and Training Transformation (T2) initiatives by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) point to a renewed emphasis on ensuring our military forces and supporting agencies are fully prepared to execute their assigned missions.

The implications for these initiatives are pervasive, and likely to fundamentally change how our Armed Forces prepare, and by extension, employ to execute their missions. One area that will be appreciably changed is how commanders assess and report the readiness of units under their command and purview. Yet as significant as these changes are for the Department of Defense (DoD) as a whole, they are particularly important within the context of the joint environment.

Assessment of joint readiness can occur at multiple levels, using a wide range of processes, reporting in a variety of forms and forums. However, the imminent transition to a comprehensive DoD readiness reporting system based on the use of mission essential tasks signals a major change. Assessments will soon be conducted and reported within a mandated and common framework. This mandate, directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness⁴, represents a significant point of departure for future joint assessments as it, for the first time, establishes a standardized readiness construct for the entire DoD community. The new guidance implicitly acknowledges that DoD remains a highly

⁴ Department of Defense Directive, Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), June 3, 2002, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

differentiated organization, but now overlays all the highly specialized organizations within DoD with a common assessment framework.

A key part of any discussion regarding assessments should be focused on *why* the assessments are being done—what is the objective of the effort? And while assessments may be conducted at many levels; at the OSD, combatant commander, and Combat Support Agency (CSA) perspectives, assessments should be focused on deriving *holistic* interpretations of readiness. These determinations should answer the questions: “Do those organizations possess the right capabilities and are they capable of accomplishing their assigned missions?” The related challenge is establishing the right level of granularity for such assessments and ensuring that the assessment approach includes all relevant factors. The issue of granularity is effectively eased by application of a UJTL-based approach across DoD since it inherently provides a “top to bottom” linkage mechanism for assessment results. The issue of including all assessment factors must still be studied, and should include consideration of the readiness of personnel, materiel, and the ability of the two to effectively function together. A final consideration with respect to readiness must include the context within which the readiness questions and results are framed, or as stated by Mr. Betts in *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, and Consequences*⁵:

“The main question for policy and strategy should not be how to achieve readiness in any single sense. Rather, it is how to integrate or balance the answers to the following questions over a long period of time.”: Readiness for when? How long to “ready”? Readiness for what? “Ready” to perform what tasks? Readiness for where? “Ready” for what theater or combat environment?”

Also important is guidance regarding how the assessments will be executed. The DRRS Directive, 3 June 2002 states that the purpose of DRRS is to: “*Establish a capabilities-based, adaptive, near real time reporting system for the Department of Defense*”⁶ that will require unprecedented levels of assessment-focused automation, interoperability and connectivity throughout the joint community. Successful implementation of the DRRS will largely depend on identifying the best approach, then developing and applying supporting technological enablers.

⁵ Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 32-33

⁶ Department of Defense Directive, Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), June 3, 2002, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

1.2 Purpose. This paper discusses the future of joint assessments, especially in light of the Defense Readiness Reporting System and evolving Training Transformation (T2) guidance. The inclusion of both DRRS and T2 is significant as the focus of this paper is to resolve the discussion down to the assessment of joint training activities. The paper provides a succinct overview and summary on the state of current joint assessment programs and provides possible approaches for enhancing and implementing assessments given current and expected OSD direction.

1.3 Defining Assessment and Readiness. Terms such as assessment and evaluation possess a degree of definitional ambiguity that must be minimized before continued discussion. The definitions used in the case of this paper are not intended to apply universally, but instead are intended to contextually frame this paper's discussion.

- Assessment is used as a holistic interpretation of formal and informal data sets (which may include objective and subjective data), gathered over time to determine an organization's ability to execute assigned missions. Inherent in assessment is the commander's ability to subjectively assess readiness based on an entire body of evidence and experience.⁷
- Assessment is intended to provide a methodology of identifying issues and shortfalls that should be analyzed with respect to risk and resource allocation. In addition, assessment is intended to provide a summary of performance with respect to specific mission-related activities.⁸
- Evaluation is used to measure a specific audience's proficiency in accomplishing specific tasks, under certain training conditions, to a designated level of performance.
- Assessment takes place at various levels within organizations and is done so for different purposes.
 - Readiness assessment, the primary focus of DRRS is designed to measure an organization's ability to accomplish assigned missions. It may be measured as a total measurement of readiness across the range of DOTMLPF activities and discretely by each DOTMLPF element.

⁷ CJCS Manual 3500.03, Joint Training Manual, 1 June 1996, pp. VII-1

⁸ CJCS Manual 3500.03, Joint Training Manual, 1 June 1996, pp. III-3

- Training assessment is a relevant example at the discrete DOTMLPF element level. Training assessment supports the overall readiness assessment measurement, and focuses on the training audience's level of performance to standard, the effectiveness of the training itself, and the support provided by the training organization and process. Training assessment primarily focuses on the doctrine, training, and personnel elements of DOTMLPF, but may also contribute to the assessment of other elements.

1.4 *Assumptions.*

- Assessment of joint readiness will be implemented via OSD direction as outlined DoD Directive, Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), June 3, 2002.
- Proposals herein are intended to be both acceptable and feasible given applicable DoD guidance and directives.
- The reader has an understanding of basic DoD guidance and directives such as Title 10, Joint and Service doctrine, Unified Action Armed Forces, etc.
- The reader is familiar with current joint and Service readiness reporting and assessment processes.

Status of Joint Assessments

The Services have long evaluated and internally assessed their respective performance and readiness. Moreover, these processes are accepted parts of Service culture and understood as necessary to any military unit's and military individual's development and preparedness. Evaluation and assessment are organic to almost every Service organization, often to the point of these functions establishing a fulcrum on which almost all activities are based. Examples range from major unit inspections (such as US Air Force Major Command Inspector General Operational Readiness Inspections) to individual evaluations (such as US Army helicopter aviator flight checks). However, Service acceptance of evaluations and assessments has not transferred to the joint environment and few effective assessment or evaluation processes exist within the joint community. The causes for this difference between individual Service and joint cultures are both overt and subtle.

Perhaps the most overt cause is clear demarcations between Title 10 Service, combatant commander, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) responsibilities. Title 10⁹ sets the stage by delineating responsibilities:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

combatant commanders...give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command; organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary

the *Services*...recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, service, mobilize, demobilize, administer, and maintain

These responsibilities intentionally create an environment within which joint commanders train and use assigned Service component forces solely within the context of their joint missions. In many ways, this construct has proven to be an effective one. US joint operations have ultimately been successful; however, there is definitely room for

⁹ Title 10, United States Code, Chapters, 5 (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 6 (combatant commands), and respective Service Subtitles.

improvement. But, deciding what needs improvement and then how to implement improvement has proven daunting. The only common denominator between joint operations may be a lack of commonality; joint looks different every time. Because of this characteristic, and a number of systemic shortfalls, evaluation and assessment processes have not bloomed in the joint community.

These systemic shortfalls are more subtle causes behind the lack of effective joint assessment. The first is the lack of a common understanding as to what qualifies as joint readiness. Until very recently, such readiness was quantified with respect to Service readiness indicators. The understood logic was that since Service-provided forces were reported as ready, then by extension, they would also be ready to conduct joint operations as well. What this really meant was that when so called “joint forces” served under a Joint Forces Commander (JFC), they were less “joint” and more interoperable Service components operating under a joint headquarters umbrella. The primary objective sources of these Service-driven readiness indicators are the respective Status of Readiness and Training System (SORTS) reports, which include opportunities for commanders at multiple levels to influence objective data results with their subjective impressions. However, these readiness reporting processes do not always transfer smoothly to specific joint criteria. For example, JTF staff effectiveness is extremely tough to measure relative to Service SORTS data.

As examples of joint readiness reporting processes, the following assessment process summaries are windows into three significantly different approaches to measuring joint readiness. Their inclusion in the paper is provided for two reasons: first, as part of an effort to describe joint assessment processes; second, as a way of highlighting specific strengths and weaknesses inherent in each approach.

2.1 *Joint Monthly Readiness Review.*

A major component of the Chairman’s Readiness System, which became operational in 1994, is the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). The JMRR and other components of this readiness system requires each combatant commander and combat support agency to assess and report current and projected readiness given specific scenarios. The JMRR is intended to summarize the status of major combat and critical strategic forces needed to execute the National Military Strategy¹⁰.

The current format of the JMRR, including its quarterly reviews, is organized around subject areas identified from scenario assessments.

¹⁰ Title 10, United States Code, Subtitle A, Section 117

These areas serve as functional lanes within which issues, typically reported as warfighting deficiencies, are identified by combatant commands and CSAs. These issues and their expected impact upon their respective readiness areas are summarized in a quarterly report to the Senior Requirements Oversight Council (SROC). In addition to their overall readiness assessments, combatant commanders and CSAs report their specific readiness concerns, which are then tracked as deficiencies in the JMRR. Also included in the report is a SORTS-based readiness summary which includes current, trended, and projected readiness data.

This process is well established, highlights general areas of concern, and is linked to corrective action forums such as the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Senior Requirements Oversight Council (SROC).

But while the JMRR does provide a window into joint readiness, the process is not without fault. The issues and deficiencies identified with the JMRR process are often broadly stated and sometimes difficult to link to specific warfighting requirements. By implication, the degree of risk associated with each deficiency can also be difficult to quantify, making resource prioritization and allocation difficult and inefficient. Also, the JMRR is highly dependent on SORTS, which is essentially a readiness reporting registry for the Services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. SORTS has a number of widely known challenges, including: inconsistent report frequency, report skewing by aggregation or command perception, a lack of automated reporting approaches, redundancy with other reporting processes, and variation of SORTS implementation across the Services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff. The net impact of these and other shortfalls has led to a lack of credibility regarding SORTS that, by implication, negatively impacts the JMRR process.

SORTS is better suited to reporting what has happened, and less suited to serving as a predictive management tool. SORTS can help diagnose operational shortfalls by highlighting specific materiel, supply, training, and personnel issues. However, those summaries of “beans, guns, and bullets” do not effectively capture whether a unit or force is ready to conduct future operations. SORTS is less able to report on the more elusive elements of readiness that are not statistically reflected by counting things and people; it is currently not capable of capturing the impact of qualitative and “performance-oriented” factors. This measurement gap becomes especially crucial with respect to joint forces which lack a comprehensive joint training framework which can help

refine both objective SORTS data and subjective commander's assessments.¹¹

One of the results of SORTS' inability to fully capture the readiness equation has been a gap between SORTS data and commander's assessments. The picture has been further muddled by conflicting anecdotal evidence from field units. The net result of all these pieces of information may well be that they are all correct, but we have not yet developed the right approach for synthesizing it all into a meaningful readiness message.

Overall, JMRRs are fundamentally self assessment processes, providing a framework within which combatant commands may evaluate whether they can achieve success within the JMRR's scenario. This is both strength and a weakness, and in some cases may be an additional cause of skewing and inaccuracy. In addition, the JMRRs are less an assessment process and more an issue and shortfall identification process focusing on near-term readiness issues.

A more significant JMRR weakness is the lack of a meaningful linkage between what is actually being measured and what is needed for joint warfighting. The JMRR's areas such as mobility, information assurance, and logistics and sustainment provide taxonomy for classification of issues and little else. They do not help provide understanding as to their relative importance to mission success, a methodology for prioritizing, or help rationalize resourcing decisions.

2.2 CJCS Assessment Program.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a Title 10 responsibility to assess the warfighting readiness of the combatant commands and CSAs. Pursuant to Title 10, US Code, section 153, which states, "Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command." Title 10 direction is the foundation for the CJCS Assessment Program, and Combat Support Agency Review Team (CSART) assessments.

The CJCS Assessment Program is a Joint Staff J7-led effort designed to assess the warfighting readiness of the combatant commands and CSAs. The specific objective of this process is to satisfy the Chairman's responsibility to conduct independent readiness. Ideally it highlights readiness issues and concerns while verifying the effectiveness of

¹¹ Statement of Mr. Mark A. Gebicke, General Accounting Office, Statement to Congress, 1997

corrective actions. The process includes a corrective action methodology via its inclusion in the Remedial Action Program and internal Joint Staff taskings. The program is centered on a core cadre of Joint Staff action officers who are supplemented by Subject Matter Experts (SME) during assessments. Assessments are typically oriented on joint exercises, however the program does technically include assessments of real world operations and observations gathered during staff visits. Regional combatant commands are typically assessed on an annual basis, while functional commands are assessed biennially.

To some degree, the CJCS Assessment Program has been a credible and effective tool. The program largely focused on joint exercises which did permit assessment of some aspects of joint training, doctrine employment, personnel proficiency and plans sufficiency. However, joint exercises are only one band within the spectrum of joint training activities, and by extension, only a small part of the overall joint readiness equation. While efforts were made to expand the program's activities to real world operations, they were rebuffed by combatant commands that were often inundated by assessment and lessons learned teams and were wary of direct Joint Staff engagement during operations.

While the CJCS Assessment Program uncovered and then addressed some issues, the overall value added of the program was questionable. As a result, the CJCS Assessment Program is currently in hiatus at the Joint Staff J7's request. The request was based on a number of factors, including: a lack of objective and consistent assessment criteria which eventually hobbled the program's credibility and effectiveness, observations were almost wholly dependent on action officer-level interpretations of decision-maker level issues and concerns, a lack of clear distinction and synergy between this process and other assessment processes, a chronic lack of closure on key issues addressed via corrective actions mechanisms. In essence, as executed, the program's value added to the Chairman and joint community had become questionable.

While the CJCS Assessment Program is currently inactive, it potentially can fulfill a much needed niche within the assessment domain under the aegis of the DRRS and T2 initiatives. Even if the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR) and supporting Enhanced SORTS efforts reach their full potential under DRRS, there will remain a need for independent verification and status assessment. From a systemic perspective, the CJCS Assessment Program could serve as a check and balance against other assessment processes. In addition, the program could fill a much needed active collection niche within the Joint Lessons Learned Program. However, if the program is to recover its credibility, it will need sustained senior officer sustained advocacy (at least from the Director, Joint Staff)

to overcome institutionalized resistance by combatant commands to direct Joint Staff assessment. In addition, the program must adopt the same assessment criteria used by the DRRS to provide validity to comparative data and create an objective measurement framework. (The CJCS Assessment Program's previous collection plan was largely based on information gathered from other assessment and reporting sources (such as Integrated Priority List (IPL), JMRR, and SORTS), warplans, the Significant Military Exercise Brief, and a loose association with the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)).

2.3 *Combat Support Agency Review Team.*

The CSART provides an assessment of the CSA's support to the combatant commands. The CSART assessment is designed to highlight areas of success and concern via a collaborative process that includes questionnaires and surveys, interviews, and direct observation. Assessments take place at least every two years for each CSA.

The CSART assessment process is more systematic than the CJCS Assessment Program and is, by comparison, less flexible, but more comprehensive. Each assessment is comprised of six phases: (1) preparatory actions and reviews from previous assessments; (2) assessment design; (3) data collection; (4) data analysis and synthesis; (5) report coordination and dissemination; and (6) post assessment actions. This phased approach is supported via questionnaires and follow-up interviews that comprise the core of the CSART's raw data.

The CSART effectively fulfills most aspects of its CSA assessment role. One significant strength of the CSART process is its organic linkage to the JWCAs and JROC (largely due to its inclusion in the JS J8 Directorate). This linkage enhances the ability of the process to gain visibility and leverage for CSA issues and deficiencies within well known processes. Another CSART strength is the level of direct senior officer engagement in CSART processes, typically by a Joint Staff J8 general/flag officer. And finally, the inclusion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense in the CSART final review and approval process adds the final decree of credibility to the overall process.

However, there are also CSART weaknesses. First, the assessment process is almost entirely based on passive inputs provided via questionnaire that are then corroborated via personal interview and discussion. While this approach has advantages, it is also subject to skewing, both by event and over time. Second, while this assessment type may suit CSA's operating style, it would be less suitable for combatant commands. CSAs, like many support organizations, almost

perpetually fulfill their warfighting roles. The difference in wartime, for example, is more a matter of relative effort and tempo. In contrast, combatant commands are very likely to undergo massive organizational, tasking, and daily mission modifications during even relatively small scale operations. Assessments of combatant commands must embrace a wider range of activities and levels of engagement. Third, the CSART's assessment process is not likely to be viewed as sufficiently credible by uppermost leadership to justify large resource allocations or significant management/policy adjustments. Other, corroborating evidence will likely be required. And in addition (and in relation to the third), this approach lacks linkage to an objective measure protocol such as mission essential tasks – it is not sympathetic to the DRRS' format.

2.4 *Combatant Commander and Combat Support Agency Assessments.*

Some combatant commands and CSAs have, to some degree, established internal assessment processes and programs. In general, these programs roughly follow the guidelines outlined within the Joint Training System (JTS)¹² (see pp. 21-23 for additional JTS detail). However, these programs are not institutionalized across their respective staffs. More importantly, these assessment programs are largely constrained to training (actually exercise) activities and are not representative of larger, more comprehensive organization-wide assessment processes. For example, developmental activities leading to JMRRs and Integrated Priority Lists are typically executed as pure staffing activities and are not part of a systemic review, analysis, feedback, and assessment process.

2.5 *Joint Assessments...In Summary.*

The assessment processes noted above are part of a larger tapestry of assessment programs that includes the Integrated Priority List (IPL), the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP), the Joint Doctrine Development Program, the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS), and a number of other processes and activities. Collectively, all these processes have the potential to provide leadership and decision-makers a comprehensive summary on the state of joint readiness while highlighting where resources should be applied to correct shortfalls.

However, in reality, the collective assessment outcome lacks coherence, clarity, and consistency. Many of the processes are less a matter of assessment and more a matter of representing the equities of process owners. Moreover, a lack of understood points of reference between processes marginalizes the potential of useful correlation and

¹² CJCS Manual 3500.03, Joint Training Manual, 1 June 1996, pp.III 2-3, VII-5.

comparison. Bottom line, the assessments contain incredible amounts of information that is exceedingly difficult to transform into decision-quality knowledge. Mr. Mark Gebicke of the General Accounting Office accurately captured the state of OSD, joint, and Service assessment in his statement to Congress in 1997:

“Concerns voiced by military personnel to congressional staff during field visits are quite different from official unit readiness assessment reports forwarded through service headquarters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This difference has resulted in questions in recent years about the true measure of readiness of our military forces.”¹³

Mr. Gebicke’s comments were wholly appropriate in 1997, and they remain so today. We have yet to solve the riddle of developing and implementing a DoD assessment process that accurately summarizes our military readiness while accurately pointing to areas that need additional resources. Fortunately, that shortfall is now being addressed with development of a capabilities-based DoD readiness reporting construct that, at its core, relies on a logical lingua franca for the entire military community: mission essential tasks.

¹³ Statement of Mr. Mark A. Gebicke, General Accounting Office, Statement to Congress, 1997

Enhancing Joint Assessment, A Potential End State.

Joint assessments occur at four levels: at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, and finally, the Combat Support Agencies. Within each of these macro assessment levels, a series of internal assessments can also occur, each measuring specific units or activities. The focus of this paper is on joint readiness assessments focusing on combatant commands and combat support agencies. Assessments above those levels will be addressed, but only with respect to OSD and the Joint Staff directing, receiving, and analyzing reports.

In the larger view, this paper focuses on joint assessments at the nexus between analyzing reports and making decisions with respect to risk and resource allocation. These decisions and activities occur at only a few levels and use information from a range of assessment vehicles as background information. The one exception to this approach will be joint training assessments.

Currently, a range of assessment processes are now in place, each possessing a range of features, both positive and less successful, and each contributing in its own way to an overall readiness picture for leadership. The net result is often a confusing mélange of messages, at once difficult to decipher and even more difficult to analyze with respect to cause and effect. These difficulties apply to analysis of past and current readiness and become exponentially tougher when future readiness values are calculated. In summary there is no single assessment process with sufficient credibility nor is there a way of aggregating processes to derive a satisfactory holistic picture. A graphic summary of the existing processes is depicted in Figure 1, Current Assessment and Readiness Reporting Processes.




Figure 1 – Current Assessment and Readiness Reporting Processes

Transferring this construct, as depicted in Figure1 as an “as-is” description, to a “to-be” assessment construct which inherently builds towards integrated assessment outcomes requires some sort of common framework and terms of reference. This construct, depicted in Figure 2 now reflects how the current construct will likely be influenced by DRRS and T2. There are several key characteristics of the depictions that bears reflection. First, the construct support DRRS guidance to fully leverage, to the maximum extent possible, legacy processes and existing DoD transactional databases. And second, while an “integrated” system may ostensibly be mandated via fiat, the system will essentially remain horizontally and vertically isolated without a common underlying framework.




Figure 2 – First step towards an integrated Assessment process

The key to transitioning the "system" in Figure 2 to a more meaningful process lies in providing a common language and basis of reference that applies for all the activities captured in every process and that naturally links uppermost assessment outcomes with discrete evaluation inputs. Figure 3, shown below displays this iteration of the "system's" evolution by including the UJTL and derived mission essential tasks.

Overall, the construct is based on the UJTL and specifically mission essential tasks for each organization. In addition, the system inherently possesses an expectation that commanders at each level will assess readiness based on the totality of evaluations, observations, personal experience, operations, exercises, and other feedback. Also, the linkage to METs and supporting tasks, conditions, and standards serves as a methodology for linking assessment results to DOTMLPF. Part of this linkage and methodology must also include recognition that assessment areas vary to the degree that they analyze aspects of the DOTMLPF spectrum. For example, Figure 1's enhanced view of training assessments acknowledges that area's increased ability to report on Doctrine, Training, and Education results.




Figure 3 – Mature Assessment and Readiness system
A more holistic integrated Assessment process

Part of the assessment process that largely flows towards the top levels of the chain of command are verification processes that progress downwards. In this case, the CJCS Assessment Program and CSART are used for the combatant commands and combat support agencies respectively. These alternative, but supporting assessments not only help ensure the long term viability of the process, but corroborate assessment results and confirm that resource adjustments and management decisions have had the desired effect. However, both programs will also need substantial adjustment (as specified earlier in this document), both to improve their core assessment processes, and to synchronize their approaches and results with the overall assessment system.

One part of the portrayed system in Figure 3 that is not derived from an existing assessment process is the joint training assessment process. While joint training assessment is an acknowledged imperative, in practice it is sporadically executed (hence it is highlighted (in white) in Figure 3). However, the Joint Training System (JTS) does describe a training assessment process that can fulfill the training assessment requirement. From the perspective of joint training, assessment activities may serve three objectives: as inputs to future training cycles, as a source of inputs for command training reports, and as part of capability assessments.

Within joint training itself, assessments may also accomplish three objectives. They may help capture the training proficiency of an

audience, measure the efficacy of the joint training itself, and measure the effectiveness of CJCS training policies, standards, and support.

These descriptions, while basic, are important since they set the stage for understanding the differences between assessment activities inherent in joint training and those designed to provide an overall picture of joint readiness. Said another way, the transition to an effective assessment and readiness reporting system is not a zero sum environment. Assessment processes, when properly structured, can concurrently and effectively fulfill internal and external feedback and reporting requirements.

Before outlining joint training assessment processes, it is important to recognize that joint training is the sum of all training related activities required to accomplish the mission. These activities may include: classroom instruction, exercises, OJT, distributed learning, formal academic programs, experiments, simulations, and direction observation. For all these activities, the training recipients (audience) may be evaluated to gauge their acquired competencies for individual tasks and activities. These evaluations may then be consecutively aggregated as through the training assessment process and up the chain of command.




Figure 4 – Joint Training Assessment

Within the Joint Training System (JTS), the commander is the primary trainer, and by implication the primary assessor of training effectiveness. The importance of assessment, especially from a training perspective, is emphasized by Joint Training Policy, which adds a new tenet of joint training that notes a complete training program must include assessment. This assessment process outlined within the Joint Training Master Plan is graphically represented at Figure 4. This assessment program explicitly leverages the UJTL-based framework mandated by DRRS and supported by T2. Underlying the DRRS and T2 are several realities with respect to joint activities and training:

- The UJTL provides a common operationally relevant language across DoD, encompassing Service, joint, and CSA activities. This is more than a matter of communication, and as much a matter of establishing mutually recognizable frames of reference across functions and organizations.
- Under the UJTL rubric, all joint activities can be related to tasks, conditions, and measures. In other words, all mission-related activities of the joint (and joint support) community are measurable and quantifiable. This established a methodology for correlation, comparison and risk analysis.
- The DOTLPF construct provides a complete methodology for framing and addressing required capabilities.
- The JTS and the greater joint community are mutually dependent processes. As joint core processes are developed, so too must robust joint training plans and activities. Joint training is not optional but is an organic part of the joint readiness and warfighting calculus.

Yet, despite already possessing a logical template for assessing joint training, the assessment element of the JTS remains immature, largely due to several causes.

1. Joint training and joint operations, especially at the combatant command level, are not viewed as symbiotic, but are instead competitors. Combatant commanders and staff are often forced to choose between support to training or operational events, with operations logically assuming first priority.
2. Resource prioritization and rationalization for training activities have been hard for staffs to capture. The potential impacts of lost training have been difficult to quantify and hence, comparisons against other competing equities have often left training requests wanting.
3. Joint Training and Joint Exercises have been considered synonymous. Whether it is JTF staff exercises or Service components merging at the operational level, joint exercises are often the only coherent joint training activities in a combatant command's training plan.
4. Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures have sometimes been used as a training replacement, with joint

exercises postured as the finishing/practical application element of the training environment.

However, the imminent DRRS and T2 evolutions that will in effect use UJTL and DOTLPF to harmonize activities across the entire DoD domain will mitigate the causal factors noted above.

1. The DRRS and T2 will focus operational readiness and training activities on Defense Planning Guidance and Contingency Planning Guidance. A primary goal of T2 is to, “Provide comprehensive and systematic “Joint” training focused on the operational requirement of the combatant commanders and linked to readiness assessment”.¹⁴
2. Training activities will become direct requirements in support of warfighting capabilities. When required training is lost, measurable impact against capability will be captured via the mission essential tasks framework.
3. T2 acknowledges the importance of formally expanding joint training beyond its current “exercise-centric” focus, placing particular emphasis on technology-enabled solutions.
4. Joint readiness and training will be driven by warfighting requirements, and then assessed within that same context. Shortfalls in existing training plans will be identified and then mitigated within the DRRS process. Understanding joint doctrine and TTP will rightly be understood as competencies required for joint operations, and not as training replacements.

Executing Assessments.

3.1 *National Readiness.*

Currently, no forum or process exists for assessing whether the DoD is prepared to support its missions as outlined in Defense Planning Guidance and Contingency Planning Guidance. Although the DRRS sets the stage for enhanced readiness reporting, it does not yet provide a constructive way ahead for objectively testing those results.

One approach to ensuring the veracity of readiness reports is to verify and test via the Chairman’s assessment program and the CSART, as outlined in Figure 3. However these processes are part of a checks and

¹⁴ Strategic Plan for Transforming DoD Training, March 2, 2002, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Director, Readiness and Training Policy and Programs

balance process inherent in any effective reporting methodology. What is also needed is a forum which mirrors the existing Service-level assessment processes mentioned in the opening section of this paper; a realistic, results-oriented assessment that determines whether US forces are ready for their missions at the joint level.

Another key outcome that both tests the effectiveness of the readiness assessment process and fulfills a key objective is predictive readiness analysis. Such analysis is normally conducted via statistical modeling approaches using a combination of historical trends combined with assumptions. For such analysis to be effective, the validity of historical data must be unassailable. Said another way, the first step to building an effective predictive capability is to build an effective measurement capability that may then be trended and manipulated to help build expected results. The second step, which relates back to comments made by Mr. Betts¹⁵ is the importance of applying context to readiness measurements. This means that predictive analysis is also “environment-sensitive” and that care must be used to ensure trended (past) information is still relevant in the future. In this case, effective plans development processes (e.g. linked to UJTL/MET) can be instrumental in minimizing the effects of evolving environments by establishing consistent approaches and frameworks that ease comparison.




Figure 5 – Integrated Assessment Framework

¹⁵ Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 32-33

3.2 ***NIEX.***

A proposed vehicle for such assessments is the no-notice interoperability exercise (NIEX) concept currently used as a national-level event designed to directly engage senior national decision-makers in scenario-driven exercises. NIEX are currently used as familiarity activities, and are not intended to generate assessment outcomes; however, the fundamental construct is well suited to including a wide range of joint and agency activities in its format. NIEX are not intended to mirror JQRR, but would instead focus on top-level engagement and participation at the national and strategic level. These events would be administered outside the JQRR, and would in fact test and validate the JQRR's results and approaches.

The inherent challenge of such events would be the desire to minimize or gloss over negative outcomes, especially given the high level of attention and exposure such events would generate. Another challenge in such high-level and high profile events is the likelihood of NIEXs being influenced by agendas not directly associated with the actual assessment. Finally, to date NIEXs have a spotty record of execution, largely because of event cancellation due to senior participant scheduling conflicts. These issues may be mitigated by:

- Developing a highly structured, standardized event format that serves as a framework within which realistic scenarios may be inserted.
- NIEX development, execution, and assessments should continue to be conducted as highly classified, sensitive events.
- Direct SecDef and SecState endorsement of both the NIEX process/results
- Direct senior OSD, State Department, CJCS, and combatant commander event participation

3.3 ***Commander's Assessment.***

Commanders must retain the responsibility and the prerogative to subjectively influence objectively derived assessments. The current framework for such assessments remains valid; however, the linkage between commander assessment and objective measurements such as SORTS must be enhanced. This focus of this enhanced linkage is properly focused by DRRS on development of an Enhanced SORTS.

3.4 **JQRR.**

The 3 June DRRS Directive notes the JQRR will conduct timely, scenario-based quarterly assessments¹⁶. The Directive goes on to say the process will use modern analytic tools and models, as appropriate, to support assessment. While the former requirement is executable today, it will require additional development. While such tools and models exist (GOTS/COTS), the real challenge will be ensuring the adjustments are congruent with the overall assessment framework and not narrowly optimized for one process. These same assessment tools and models should be available to Services, combatant commands, and CSAs and fully interoperable with alternative approaches (if chosen by Services, combatant commands, and CSAs).

The current Joint *Monthly* Readiness Review cycle may no longer be relevant, especially if ESORTS resolves to a more timely, flexible, and effective process.

3.5 **CJCS Assessment Program/CSART.**

These two assessment processes represent widely different approaches to assessment. While the CSART is ostensibly the more successful of the two, it fills a unique niche in the assessment picture that makes direct comparison difficult. However, both processes represent validation and alternative assessment processes that can significantly enhance the overall efficacy of joint assessments. Both assessment processes may be used to assess the entire range of activities across the joint assessment spectrum, essentially serving as possible bridges between the JQRR and internal combatant command/CSA assessments.

Recommend that both processes retain their core assessment approaches (on-site team visit for CJCS Assessment Program, questionnaires plus interviews for CSART) but adopt a formal assessment underpinning of mission essential tasks. In addition, both processes should be refocused to validation activities and directly linked to the JQRR (for input) and SROC (for output).

3.6 **Enhanced SORTS.**

ESORTS is the objective backbone of the DRRS and the specific guidance provided in the Directive highlights the importance of correcting current SORTS shortfalls. These shortfalls may be categorized into two broad areas: development of a mission essential task based, metrics-driven reporting framework, and processes for analyzing and reporting derived

¹⁶ Department of Defense Directive, Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), June 3, 2002, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

data. The first area is largely a technical and coordination challenge that is defined within the DRRS Directive, and it is more a matter of reformatting and methodology adjustment.

However, the second area has broader and potentially more significant implications. Currently, SORTS is a periodically generated report largely controlled by the Services. At the combatant command, Joint Staff, OSD levels, SORTS are essentially report “outcomes” that stand alone and are difficult to verify or further quantify. For several reasons, this may change under DRRS. First, the DRRS mandated development of a near real-time data collection capability will permit senior users to access readiness information on an as required basis. Further, the system may enable non-Service users to directly extract results without Service vetting. Second, the current system’s lack of correlation between SORTS and subjective commander assessment has to some extent, been ignored due to a lack of overall confidence in SORTS itself. Once ESORTS becomes a more effective and reliable tool, commander assessments that conflict with objective data may be more scrutinized. Third, the mission essential task linkage between ESORTS data at all levels may permit direct association of readiness shortfalls at relatively discrete levels. This means that shortfalls that may have been either masked or averaged in aggregate “roll-ups” may now be traced down to the unit level. And fourth, the DRRS’ direction that CJCS will “In collaboration with USD (P&R), develop and maintain a registry of apportioned forces to report in ESORTS, and fully integrate ESORTS information places a degree of forces accountability and responsibility on the Joint Staff.

3.7 Internal combatant command/CSA assessments.

Combatant commands and combat support agencies are working to develop their respective assessment processes. These processes will be and should be tailored to each organization; however, they should also be interoperable with one another and the JQRR. Each process should be synchronized with the DRRS, and relatable in both input and output. While the level of detail, frequency, and focus may be different, internal assessment results must be sympathetic with those derived from the JQRR.

The primary objective of internal assessment processes should be to derive a holistic determination of the command or agency’s readiness. This means that the readiness assessment should include three broad ranges of activities: people, materiel, and linked performance. The first activity, people, includes factors such as sufficient numbers of trained and experienced personnel. The second, materiel, includes a wide range of factors such ranging from bullets to infrastructure. The third, linked performance, addresses the ability of the two factors to successfully

interact to standard. To some extent, the first two activities can be addressed by ESORTS, while the third must be addressed through other forms of assessment and evaluation. Said another way, for the assessments results to be holistic, the assessment approach should also be so.

All the processes noted so far, SORTS, the CJCS Assessment Program, CSART, JMRR, anecdotal field comments, and commander's assessment, help contribute to the overall readiness picture. This multi-sourced approach may also be useful for internal combatant command/CSA assessment processes as well. The three formal readiness reporting processes, the JMRR, CSART, and CJCS Assessment Program use different **approaches** to arriving at assessment results. The JMRR primarily uses objective SORTS data, scenario results, and commander assessments. CSART is survey and interview dependent, while the CJCS Assessment Program primarily uses direct observation and anecdotal evidence. The strongest elements of each approach may be suitable for adoption for internal combatant command and CSA assessments.




Figure 6 – Key Assessment Processes

Such an internal assessment program should reflect the DRRS' overall structure (as a matter of convenience and efficiency), and use mission essential tasks (as directed by DRRS) as the basic measurement framework. If we transfer the aforementioned **approaches** to a command/CSA's assessment program, we can see what additional taskings and roles must be absorbed to conduct assessments:

- SORTS analysis and correlation
- Reciprocal linkages (limited reports and interrogation capability) between SORTS databases, including centralized (currently GSORTS database maintained by DISA for Joint Staff)
- Survey/interview development, execution, and analysis
- Direct observation
- Anecdotal observation collection and analysis
- Scenario-based assessment

Some of these taskings and roles are to some degree already being done by elements of a command's staff. For example, IPL development, SORTS analysis, and JMRR preparation are a regular element of staff responsibilities. The net effect for such activities is less additive and more a matter of shifting workload. Other taskings are more heavily focused on start-up activities (such as survey/interview development) which can be shared among several organizations. An important consideration is that the process is less dependent on the actual collection of information, and more focused on acquiring the right information and deriving accurate conclusions regarding readiness.

A related set of issues that must also be addressed are more execution focused, and include (with possible approaches):

- Frequency of assessment (quarterly and annual)
- Level of granularity (MET-based, to operational level)
- Direct observation/scenario vehicle (operational exercise)
- Assessor training (distributed learning)
- Assessor experience (based on joint and theater experience)
- Grade/Rank (same as established IG structure)
- Reporting methodology (close-hold report to commander)

Another objective of these internal assessment processes should be to enhance the combatant commander/director's ability to assess readiness. This objective sets the stage for who will conduct internal assessments and where the assessment group is situated. Implied within "who" will conduct internal assessments is whether assessors should be specifically selected, trained, and experienced for their roles. Reflecting again on how Services approach the issue, we see a consistent effort to develop specialized cadres who conduct assessment and evaluation activities. While this approach may not be appropriate within the joint environment, the supporting rationale for the approach suggests that not just anyone is qualified to assess and evaluate; that some sort of additive "skillsets" are required.

A possible approach to satisfying this requirement would be to develop an assessment "oriented" group at combatant commands/CSAs that function outside the normal staff process and have a direct link to command-level functions. In some respects, this role is similar to what Inspector Generals (IG) are now fulfilling. IG and their supporting staff are institutionalized throughout DoD and currently serve as advisors to commanders, as auditors and investigators, and as alternative feedback and reporting processes. These roles are an effective starting point for developing an internal program focused on assessing command readiness. While some additional staff positions may be required to fulfill

the assessment role, an alternative approach might be selective use of subject matter experts from the commands' staff as trusted agents.


An alternative approach would be to imbed the assessors within existing primary directorates such as operations (J3), intelligence (J2), plans (J5), or training (J7, when separate from J3's). However, since the assessment process is intended to provide the commander an accurate and unvarnished view of internal readiness and associated issues, such an approach may be unproductive over the long term.

3.8 *Specific Assessments (Joint Training).*

The Joint Training System (JTS) is a relevant example of a fairly mature and sophisticated assessment process that does not achieve maximum potential due to the ineffectiveness of the overall assessment construct. The JTS' assessment approach is detailed in the Joint Training Manual, Joint Training Master Plan, and in Joint Training Policy yet has not been fully adopted or implemented across the joint community. Aside from the aforementioned issues relating to joint training, the JTS assessment process also suffers from a perceived lack of "value added" that hinders investment, commitment, and credibility. All that being said, the implantation of DRRS and T2 are likely to significantly change that perception and the relative importance of the JTS assessment process.

Joint training assessment is the process of determining an organization's proficiency to meet the capability requirements defined in joint mission essential tasks. The assessment phase of the JTS provides the commander and staffs at each level of command valuable

information about the command's capability to perform its assigned missions. These insights provide a direct pay-off in terms of improved mission capability for the effort associated with the first three phases of the JTS. The challenge of the assessment phase is to provide a clear structure to institutionally capture those insights to create a learning organization. The assessment phase of the JTS describes how the collective training results over time are (1) *translated into future training requirements for subsequent training cycles*, (2) *developed into lessons learned*, (3) *used to identify and resolve Issues*, and (4) *made available to other users of training information*.



JMETL, training objectives, training performance observations, and training proficiency evaluations all comprise developmental activities leading to JTS assessment (Phase IV). The first step involves the

collection of training proficiency data from within the command over the period of the assessment which is then translated into more comprehensive Training Proficiency Assessments (TPAs). Developing TPAs consists of two activities, initially on the organizational level, and then as assessments of JMETs by mission.

Finally, at least within the context of the training activity, the TPAs are used by the commander to help assess the overall training effectiveness and possibly comment on the readiness of the training audience. The commander may use these assessments as part of a larger assessment that over time will be used to adjust training plans and resources as well as a contributing element of the overall organization's mission readiness.

Formal linkages to the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) and the Remedial Action Program (RAP) as well as internal issue resolution and lessons learned processes are an inherent and significant element of the JTS. The JLLP and RAP, and similar processes are especially important to training assessment activities, and provide follow-on analysis and issue resolution activities.

However, the JTS assessment process noted above is only partially implemented. The JTS is a relatively new construct and is only now becoming fully institutionalized across the joint community. In addition, the JTS, like any other process, needs support and resources to survive; a good process is not always enough. JTIMS, for example, is an important enabler for the JTS that is now in its latter stages of development and full implementation. Once fully operational, JTIMS will strengthen some key aspects of the JTS. But even then, more work will be needed. The JTS must enhance its relationships and linkage to the broader range of activities, especially as they relate to training development and assessments. This need is strongly implied in both the DRRS and T2, which by consistently stressing the need to "Provide comprehensive and systematic "Joint" training focused on the operational requirements of the combatant commanders and linked to readiness." An additional improvement to the existing process would be inclusion of more graduated evaluation criteria (vice the current Trained (T), Partially Trained (P), Untrained (U)) which would provide more descriptive feedback. One solution, would be to adopt criteria similar to that proposed in the draft Joint Training Master Plan for reporting readiness rating criteria ranging from 1-5 (with 1 being best). This approach would not only prove more informative, but would also correlate with other reporting methodologies.




Figure 7 – “As Is” Summary of Today’s Joint Training Assessment Process

The joint training assessment process described above provides a broad overview of the existing process, and sets the stage for significantly improving the program via DoD-wide adoption of a UJTL-based readiness

JMET	CINC	JIC(J2)	JOC(J3)	JFACC	JTF
ST 1	X				X
ST 4.2.5				X	
ST 8.3	X				X
ST 7.1.4					X
ST 5.1.4			X		
ST 2		X			
ST 2.2.3		X			

reporting process. T2 provides another key source of improvement by moving towards an

institutionalized joint training-operations-plans continuum.¹⁷ Impending adjustments to the JTS are also helping, in particular by recognizing that the DRRS’ approach will facilitate directly fixing responsibility for tasks against specific organizations and elements. Not only will this fixing of responsibility help clarify ownership of activities but it will also lead to enhanced understanding of what capabilities are needed to achieve mission success. And because mission success is then described as evolutions of tasks, conditions, and standards under the mission essential task construct the basis for an effective training assessment plan is inherently in place.

¹⁷ Strategic Plan for Transforming DoD Training, March 2, 2002, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Director, Readiness and Training Policy and Programs

For the concept of an effective readiness reporting system to become reality, there must be effective linkages between plans, training, and assessment processes. While mission essential tasks have been chosen as the linking, common framework, the only current meaningful linkage is between mission essential tasks and some joint training (primarily exercises) activities. (There is no full linkage of METs to other joint training largely because other joint training is almost non-existent.) Other linkages between plans, mission essential tasks, and readiness reporting are also weak to non-existent; essentially permitting an atmosphere of virtually uncoordinated activities all designed to support a common goal, mission execution.

If the training assessment process is to fulfill its potential within the larger DRRS readiness assessment process, the following process adjustments should be considered:

- Linkages from guidance documents (such as DPG), plans, commander/director guidance, etc. to training plans and activities via METs.
- Developing assessment and evaluation plans and approaches that leverage MET-based conditions and standards.
- Developing comprehensive joint training programs that include other activities necessary to support the full range of joint mission and mission support requirements.
- Development of output linkages to Training Plan Development and internal/Joint Lessons Learned Programs.
- Development of output and feedback linkages to internal/external issue resolution processes.
- Development of out linkages to command-level assessment and report processes (such as Integrated Priority Lists, JQRR/JMRR, ESORTS/GSORT).
- Development of an assessment/evaluation staff cadre possessing correct tools (such as fully developed JTIMS as noted below), training, experience, and internal staff linkages.

If these adjustments are made, the stage can be set for Figure 7's "As Is" Joint Training Assessment Process can transition to the process depicted in Figure 8.




Figure 8 – “To-Be” Summary of Joint Training Assessment Process

Two related aspects of training assessment activities that should be addressed is (1) the suitability of the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) for holistic training assessment activities and recommended adjustments and (2) the linkage of joint training assessment results to other readiness reporting processes.

(1) Assessment of Joint Training: Training assessment can be partly supported by the Joint Training Information Management System’s (JTIMS) execution and assessment phases. Like the JTS, JTIMS

consists of four primary phases (Requirements, Planning, Execution, and Assessment) and is approaching full operation capability in most areas. However, JTIMS' weakest area is the assessment phase and the program does not yet support a comprehensive assessment of execution phase activities. This is largely a technical challenge and will likely be overcome as JTIMS evolves; however, it remains a significant hurdle that must be overcome if joint training assessment is to mature.

Another inherent shortfall of JTIMS is its dependency on the joint exercise environment and as noted earlier, joint exercises are but part of the overall joint training picture. Imbedded within this shortfall is that JTIMS was designed as a "closed-loop" system designed around an exercise's "life-cycle" – it is intentionally designed and constrained to joint exercises.

JTIMS' assessment phase was not designed to provide the degree of assessment activities envisioned by this paper or DRRS. Rather, JTIMS assessment activities are designed to influence future training events as a feedback mechanism. An additional challenge is the relative complexity of JTIMS from the user's perspective. JTIMS is optimized for use by staff training cadres who are intimate with the exercise development and execution process.

Possible mitigating approaches to the shortfalls noted above include refocusing JTIMS so that it is less an exercise-centric tool and more an operations and training support tool. In a way, this adjustment has already begun as JTIMS developers are exploring ways of integrating operational activities into the JTIMS framework. However, this adaptation is really designed as a scheduling and deconfliction activity and not as an "operationalizing" evolution. Nonetheless, it is a step in the right direction and sufficient investment has been made in JTIMS to warrant exploring (as entering arguments):

- Whether JTIMS may provide automated training evaluations suitable for command-level assessment.
- Whether JTIMS may expand to include integration of all joint training activities.
- If JTIMS may be enhanced to provide a more "user-friendly" operating environment.
- Significant expansion and enhancement of the JTIMS assessment phase to include direct linkage to other training activities, inputs, and

development of support activities designed to enhance command-level interpretation of training evaluations and results. This enhancement should include reporting linkages to the commands ESORTS environment.

These adjustments to JTIMS are not near-term solutions, may not be fully executable, or may not be adaptable to the full range of joint training activities. Hence, combatant commands must also develop tailored assessment processes that function outside or in parallel with JTIMS. One approach might be to leverage and enhance combatant command activities such as their respective Inspector Generals (IG). IGs could be developed into a core cadre of assessors that could objectively analyze the full range of combatant command activities and do so within via existing and proven command level reporting processes. IG staffs are manned differently at each combatant command and to some extent serve varying functions, however, in the main they generally possess the skills, experience, and organizational credibility to serve in this role. In addition, the IG staffs would need to conduct assessments in accordance with an approved set of joint standards and evaluation criteria. Of course, METs would provide the basic framework for *what* to assess, but standards regarding *how*, *when*, *why* and *who* to assess are also necessary.

(2) Linkage of joint training results to other readiness reporting processes: Within JTIMS, joint training assessment is currently an internal exercise development process. Assuming the aforementioned adjustments to this focus were accomplished, there must still be a process in place for forwarding assessment results to external sources. This process must also be in place of other assessment processes (such as the proposed IG-based approach.) For these processes to meet the intent of DRRS guidance, they must possess a degree of automation and near-real time interrogation capacity. This capability will require development or adaptation of tools not yet in common use across DoD.

Yet providing a reporting process is irrelevant unless the assessment data target is prepared for receipt. DRRS' direction to, "*Develop resource and training standards for all organizations designated for inclusion in ESORTS according to prescribed guidelines in reference (b)*" directs that ESORTS be developed to fully support the output of joint training assessment results. This particular challenge is really a matter of reformatting the current GSORTS structure to include joint training activities.

3.9 *Risk and Information Control*

One challenge that should be addressed is the potential for the described assessment and reporting processes to marginalize the commander's impact. To maintain the right relationship between authority and responsibility, assessment processes must inherently include the commander's subject analysis of results. METs, ESORTs, and supporting information management processes are not replacements for commander judgment; the focus is not to take the "person out of the loop", but rather to enhance the person's ability to fully assess the readiness of the organization under their command.

3.10 Impacts of DRRS and T2.

DRRS


Viewed through a lens encompassing the DoD, the DRRS will be a seminal event, fundamentally changing the foundation upon which readiness reporting rests.

The implications of DRRS for the joint community are very significant, and set the stage for establishment of a meaningful readiness assessment process. For the first time, the DoD will use a singular construct that will in turn leverage a universal tasking taxonomy that is then traceable from the warplans through resourcing continuum. Other mandates expected in DRRS will include the ability to provide near real time (web based) readiness reports that are based on an enhanced version of the current SORTS (ESORTS).

Moreover, second order implications of the DRRS are also important. The DRRS will forcibly move the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) outside the purely "training" environment and into common usage across DoD. UJTL are too often interpreted and used as simply a training tool around which training events, curriculum, and exercises are built. Similarly, Joint, Agency, and Service essential tasks (J/A/Service MET), have suffered a similar fate and are often closeted within organization's training and exercise departments. In reality, the UJTL and METs define everything that the DoD does, at the strategic through tactical levels. The UJTL provides a menu of activities from which specific units and organizations derive the METs that support their respective missions.

This reality is complicated by joint training processes that do not fully leverage the UJTL or METs, partly because of the overall immaturity of


the entire joint training construct and partly because of the lesser emphasis given pure joint training activities.



UJTL/METs acknowledged as organic to training and exercises, but currently not fully integrated into core processes

DRRS will squarely place the onus of reporting readiness of assigned forces on joint commanders. While Services retain the responsibility of readiness reporting for their respective forces, combatant commanders will, “Include as measured units within ESORTS joint operational and support organizational organizations under their command that are needed to execute mission essential tasks.” This readiness reporting responsibility is directly associated with fulfillment of assigned missions and derived mission essential tasks.

By definition, METs are directly linked to an organization’s missions (and by extension plans) and specifically define what activities and resources are required to satisfy those responsibilities. This linkage provides a solution to the most vexing challenge of the current assessment environment by specifically highlighting which task is at risk. Not only will this construct permit, for the first time, meaningful analysis of risk, but it will also link resourcing decisions to gap mitigation.



UJTL/METs perceived as training methodology/process, little to no linkages to current operations


While the analysis and programmatic impacts of DRRS are important, the perceptual impacts are equally significant. To date, joint (and DoD) assessments have lacked credibility throughout the reporting and decision-making process. Recent readiness reports provide an example: Typical SORTS often show stable unit readiness data, while interviewed personnel express grave concern regarding the adverse impacts of deployments upon readiness. The comments of personnel, were until fairly recently, echoed by their commanders. And only recently have commanders themselves become more vocal regarding readiness concerns.

In addition, commanders sometimes view SORTS as more a personal performance scorecard than true objective measure of performance and may tend to subjectively upgrade readiness indicators. The corollary is even more telling; if a commander were to downgrade positive SORTS

indicators, it is easy to envision how senior commanders might question the commander's effectiveness.


The important component of both examples is a lack of confidence in the current system. Its objective (SORTS) measurement does not provide a solid basis upon which subjective assessments can be made. In addition, since SORTS "rolls up" assessments, what may be a capabilities "show-stopper" at low levels may be averaged-away at higher levels.

However, a METs-based SORTS construct provides an entirely different assessment scenario. Simply put, by using mission essential tasks as the SORTS baseline, commanders will know that: the entire DoD is using a similar reporting framework, the methodology is directly tasked to unit mission, METs, and core competencies, and that highlighting shortfall will productively highlight gaps and shortfalls for decision-makers.



*Adopted into JMRR, but not part of overall assessment
no full linkages established*

A final but equally significant impact of DRRS will be the linkage of planning (deliberate and contingency) activities to mission essential tasks and carrying that linkage through to top level readiness reporting. This linkage should lead to joint planners characterizing operational and operational support activities in terms of mission essential tasks. This characterization will lead to mission essential tasks serving as a common ground between joint planning, operational, and training activities. More important, joint training will finally become meaningful in the joint environment.



*No direct linkage, core processes not structured to fully
leverage UJTL/METs*

Taken in sum, the DRRS is not a deconstruction of current assessment processes. Instead it establishes effective policies and directs use of a practical and appropriate measurement construct that will enhance DoD readiness reporting.

T2

The Strategic Plan for Transforming DoD Training fully supports the DRRS. Like the DRRS, T2 relies on mission essential tasks and operational requirements as its foundation, but instead of supporting readiness reporting it is now focused on training activities.

Currently, joint training is largely considered synonymous with joint exercises. While at professional military education institutions, joint training is considered to be joint education. However, exercises are opportunities within which an audience may put its training into practice, and while some training is derived, they cannot be an effective sole source of training. Also, joint exercises serve a number of agendas, with political and engagement activities being key drivers. While these agendas do not necessarily eliminate training opportunities, they do influence and often reduce overall training effectiveness due to competing resource demands, classification/security issues, time constraints, competing participant objectives, etc.

Underlying this lack of joint training is an apparent assumption that the core capabilities derived by individuals at the Service level will fulfill requirements at the joint level. This assumption is indirectly reinforced by joint doctrine. For example, the operational core of joint, the Joint Task Force, is intentionally an ad-hoc construct, ostensibly to permit commanders to tailor the JTF to mission and environment. While this approach has advantages, it has also fostered a perception that training and preparation are to some extent unnecessary or even wasteful. Both of the aforementioned issues are problematic. Service core competencies do not always seamlessly match with those required in the joint environment.

Just as the core competencies at the Service level are supported by underpinning of basic training and indoctrination, so must core competencies at the joint level. Just as Services first train, then exercise; so too must combatant commanders. And it is T2 that will set the stage for just that training by establishing a process that uses operational requirements as the basis around which training requirements are built.

One key advantage not yet addressed that will result from DRRS and T2 will be the ability to link assessment activities and results to DOTMLPF activities (Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities). DOTLMPF defines all armed forces' the capabilities and more important for our purposes, provides a construct template for linking and tracing cause, effect, and corrective action.

These operational requirements, METs, will reinforce the common UJTL language underscored by the DRRS. Joint training will directly support mission activities and, via the readiness reporting process, be included as part of the overall assessment, risk analysis, and resourcing calculus.

The Way Ahead and Approach

At this point, the comprehensive readiness and training assessment constructs outlined by DRRS and T2 are more promise than reality. Today's loose association of various readiness and training assessment processes (reality), must somehow evolve into an integrated, responsive, and predictive (promise) readiness and training assessment capability. This evolution will not be free, and will take commitment, time, resources, and money. These four "requirements" are briefly highlighted below, less as an attempt to accurately quantify what needs to be done, and more to help expose what types of things need to be done.

Commitment: The DRRS and T2 are top-down driven activities, and provide guidance to the entire Department of Defense. However, leadership at all levels must actively endorse what DRRS and T2 are seeking to do if significant and productive change is to occur. Not only must the DoD overcome the natural resistance to change, it must also overcome a reluctance to truly *assess* within the joint community, an added risk.

If the DRRS is simply viewed as a J3/ops construct, then it will obscure and exclude other key activities that are important to accurately gathering the entire readiness picture. If T2 is constrained to purely training activities, it will not gain the linkage and integration needed to seamlessly link plans, operations, training, and readiness. By definition, jointness means at the very least interoperability, and at times even integration. The OSD, Joint Staff leadership, combatant commanders, and CSA directors must commit to an integrated, collective, participative approach and solution to the assessment challenge.

Time: DRRS and T2 are not weapons systems or infrastructure. While they will be enabled by technology, they are first and foremost process tools designed to provide decision-quality information to top leadership. The DoD DRRS Directive notes the DoD will establish an "adaptive" readiness reporting system. Current readiness assessment processes are inextricably linked to reporting types of data that was relevant in a bipolar, Cold War strategic environment. Those same systems are less able to adapt to today's more complex, fluid, and information-intensive environment. Tomorrow's systems must remain germane *over time*, and must be intrinsically flexible enough to gather, analyze, and report tailored information even if today's strategic realities are look appreciably different from tomorrow's

Resources: DRRS and T2 cannot be implemented solely via management actions. While DRRS specifically highlights the need to leverage existing

resources (such as databases and commercial applications) to the maximum extent, some additional adjustments to people, training, facilities, infrastructure, policy, documentation, and procedures should be expected and anticipated.

Money: The DRRS and T2 activities must quickly and accurately be scoped to determine what level of funding effort will be required to reach the stated objectives. Then an OSD-led initiative to secure appropriate development, implementation, *and sustainment* funding should be obtained.

Summary

Overall, the impacts of DRRS and T2 set the stage for development of an effective joint readiness and training assessment process. However, development will take more than mandate, process, and technology; there must also be cultural adjustments at OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and CSAs. These adjustments must reflect a willingness to accept unprecedented levels of visibility and accountability with respect to readiness-related activities. Assessments at any level are a two-edged sword, and may expose mistakes just as readily as legitimate resource shortfalls. Ultimately, the success of joint assessments falls on leadership, and it is leadership that must lead the charge towards more credible, effective, and valuable joint readiness, training, and assessment processes.

Recommendations

1. (#) Establish an OSD-chaired, Director/Combatant Commander DoD Oversight Group comprised of CSA/Joint Staff Directors, Services, and Combatant Commanders to:
 - Monitor overall progress and provide guidance
2. (#) Establish a Director, Joint Staff-chaired, Steering Group comprised of senior representatives from combatant commanders, Services, CSAs, and OSD to:
 - Develop a DoD Assessments Development and Implementation Road
 - Map Execute overall implementation of DRRS and T2
3. (#) Establish DRRS and T2 Working Groups comprised of function senior representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, CSAs to:
 - Develop and recommend to the Steering Group integrated approaches for DRRS to include activities related to requirements, resources, personnel, sustainment, policy training, and infrastructure.
 - Develop and recommend to the Steering Group integrated approaches for T2 to include activities related to requirements, resources, personnel, sustainment, policy training, and infrastructure.
4. (#/JS J7 specific) Open/participate in joint assessments-oriented dialogue with Joint Staff J3 and J8 with the intention of integrating JQRR (J3), CSART (J8), and CJCS Assessments (J7). Outcomes should address each assessment process' challenge noted above and satisfy DRRS and T2 direction.
5. (#/JS J7 specific) Help develop collective Joint Staff assessment approach, dialogue with combatant commands, Services, and CSAs to establish coherent assessment framework.
6. Adjust JOPES and joint plans development process to base activities on mission essential task activities. (p. 27)
7. Restart the CJSC Assessment Program (after establishing approach for integrating program with overall DRRS/T2 constructs). CJCS Assessment Program processes should be

refocused to validation activities and directly linked to the JQRR (for input) and SROC (for output). (p. 17)

8. Develop mission essential task linkages and assessment approach methodologies within Combat Support Agency Readiness Team processes. CSART processes should be refocused to validation activities and directly linked to the JQRR (for input) and SROC (for output). (p.17)
9. Develop standardized output format and contextual readiness and training assessment approaches for combatant commands. Each process should be synchronized with the DRRS, and relatable in both input and output. While the level of detail, frequency, and focus may be different, internal assessment results must be sympathetic with those derived from the JQRR.* (p.18)
10. Develop standardized output format and contextual readiness and training assessment approaches for combat support agencies. While the level of detail, frequency, and focus may be different, internal assessment results must be sympathetic with those derived from the JQRR.* (p.18)
11. Establish process-oriented linkages and dependencies between plans, operations, training, and assessment processes and Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)/Mission Essential Tasks (MET). (pp. 26-27)
12. Development of approach to modify NIEX to serve as top level assessment process. Enablers for such NIEX development include (pp. 16):
 - Develop a highly structured, standardized event format that serves as a framework within which realistic scenarios may be inserted.
 - NIEX development, execution, and assessments should continue to be conducted as highly classified, sensitive events.
 - Direct SecDef and SecState endorsement of both the NIEX process/results
 - Direct senior OSD, State Department, CJCS, and combatant commander event participation
13. (#/JS J7 specific) Restart CJCS Assessment program once noted format and process shortfalls are corrected.

14. (#) Consider establishing combatant command and CSA assessment specialist program (OSD supported/funded, Joint Staff administered).
15. (#) Assessment tools and models should be developed in a collaborative, participative environment, with products and services made available to Services, combatant commands, and CSAs. Developed approaches and tools should be fully interoperable with alternative approaches (if chosen by Services, combatant commands, and CSAs).
16. Restructure/modify JTIMS activities to better support DRRS/T2 assessment activities to include internal JTIMS activities and links to external activities. (pp. 21-22)

*Collaborative activity

Enabling activity or approach

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